This one (should) explain itself (i.e., not reliable, and accordingly, not valid either). When high-stakes consequences are to be attached, this matters even more.
The ongoing lawsuit in New Mexico has, once again (see here and here), been postponed to October of 2017 due to what are largely (and pretty much only) state (i.e., Public Education Department (PED)) delays. Whether the delays are deliberate are uncertain but being involved in this case… The (still) good news is that the preliminary injunction granted to teachers last fall (see here) still holds so that teachers cannot (or are not to) face consequences as based on the state’s teacher evaluation system.
For more information, this is the email the American Federation of Teachers – New Mexico (AFT NM) and the Albuquerque Teachers Federation (ATF) sent out to all of their members yesterday:
Yesterday, both AFT NM/ATF and PED returned to court to address the ongoing legal battle against the PED evaluation system. Our lawyer proposed that we set a court date ASAP. The PED requested a date for next fall citing their busy schedule as the reason. As a result, the court date is now late October 2017.
While we are relieved to have a final court date set, we are dismayed at the amount of time that our teachers have to wait for the final ruling.
In a statement to the press, ATF President Ellen Bernstein reflected on the current state of our teachers in regards to the evaluation system, “Even though they know they can’t be harmed in their jobs right now, it bothers them in the core of their being, and nothing I can say can take that away…It’s a cloud over everybody.”
AFT NM President Stephanie Ly, said, “It is a shame our educators still don’t have a legitimate evaluation system. The PED’s previous abusive evaluation system was thankfully halted through an injunction by the New Mexico courts, and the PED has yet to create an evaluation system that uniformly and fairly evaluates educators, and have shown no signs to remedy this situation. The PED’s actions are beyond the pale, and it is simply unjust.”
While we await trial, we want to thank our members who sent in their evaluation data to help our case. Remind your colleagues that they may still advance in licensure by completing a dossier; the PED’s arbitrary rating system cannot negatively affect a teacher’s ability to advance thanks to the injunction won by AFT NM/ATF last fall. That injunction will stay in place until a ruling is issued on our case next October.
Following a post last month titled “New Empirical Evidence: Students’ ‘Persistent Economic Disadvantage’ More Likely to Bias Value-Added Estimates,” Matt Barnum — senior staff writer for The 74, an (allegedly) non-partisan, honest, and fact-based news site backed by Editor-in-Chief Campbell Brown and covering America’s education system “in crisis” (see, also, a prior post about The 74 here) — followed up with a tweet via Twitter. He wrote: “Yes, though [bias caused by economic disadvantage] likely applies with equal or even more force to other measures of teacher quality, like observations.” I replied via Twitter that I disagreed with this statement in that I was unaware of research in support of his assertion, and Barnum sent me two articles to review thereafter.
I attempted to review both of these articles herein, although I quickly figured out that I had actually read and reviewed the first (2014) piece on this blog (see original post here, see also a 2014 Brookings Institution article summarizing this piece here). In short, in this study researchers found that the observational components of states’ contemporary teacher systems certainly “add” more “value” than their value-added counterparts, especially for (in)formative purposes. However, researchers found that observational bias also exists, as akin to value-added bias, whereas teachers who are non-randomly assigned students who enter their classrooms with higher levels of prior achievement tend to get higher observational scores than teachers non-randomly assigned students entering their classrooms with lower levels of prior achievement. Researchers concluded that because districts “do not have processes in place to address the possible biases in observational scores,” statistical adjustments might be made to offset said bias, as might external observers/raters be brought in to yield more “objective” observational assessments of teachers.
For the second study, and this post here, I gave this one a more thorough read (you can find the full study, pre-publication here). Using data from the Measures of Effective
Teaching (MET) Project, in which random assignment was used (or more accurately attempted), researchers also explored the extent to which students enrolled in teachers’ classrooms influence classroom observational scores.
They found, primarily, that:
- “[T]he context in which teachers work—most notably, the incoming academic performance of their students—plays a critical role in determining teachers’ performance” as measured by teacher observations. More specifically, “ELA [English/language arts] teachers were more than twice as likely to be rated in the top performance quintile if [nearly randomly] assigned the highest achieving students compared with teachers assigned the low-est achieving students,” and “math teachers were more than 6 times as likely.” In addition, “approximately half of the teachers—48% in ELA and 54% in math—were rated in the top two performance quintiles if assigned the highest performing students, while 37% of ELA and only 18% of math teachers assigned the lowest performing students were highly rated based on classroom observation scores”
- “[T]he intentional sorting of teachers to students has a significant influence on measured performance” as well. More specifically, results further suggest that “higher performing students [are, at least sometimes] endogenously sorted into the classes of higher performing teachers…Therefore, the nonrandom and positive assignment of teachers to classes of students based on time-invariant (and unobserved) teacher
characteristics would reveal more effective teacher performance, as measured by classroom observation scores, than may actually be true.”
So, the non-random assignment of teachers biases both the value-added and observational components written into America’s now “more objective” teacher evaluation systems, as (formerly) required of all states that were to comply with federal initiatives and incentives (e.g., Race to the Top). In addition, when those responsible for assigning students to classrooms (sub)consciously favor teachers with high, prior observational scores, this exacerbates the issues. This is especially important when observational (and value-added) data are to be used for high-stakes accountability systems in that the data yielded via really both measurement systems may be less likely to reflect “true” teaching effectiveness due to “true” bias. “Indeed, teachers working with higher achieving students tend to receive higher performance ratings, above and beyond that which might be attributable to aspects of teacher quality,” and vice-versa.
Citation Study #1: Whitehurst, G. J., Chingos, M. M., & Lindquist, K. M. (2014). Evaluating teachers with classroom observations: Lessons learned in four districts. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. Retrieved from https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Evaluating-Teachers-with-Classroom-Observations.pdf
Citation Study #2: Steinberg, M. P., & Garrett, R. (2016). Classroom composition and measured teacher performance: What do teacher observation scores really measure? Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis, 38(2), 293-317. doi:10.3102/0162373715616249 Retrieved from http://static.politico.com/58/5f/f14b2b144846a9b3365b8f2b0897/study-of-classroom-observations-of-teachers.pdf
The state of Florida is another one of our state’s to watch in that, even since the passage of the Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA) last January, the state is still moving forward with using its VAMs for high-stakes accountability reform. See my most recent post about one district in Florida here, after the state ordered it to dismiss a good number of its teachers as per their low VAM scores when this school year started. After realizing this also caused or contributed to a teacher shortage in the district, the district scrambled to hire Kelly Services contracted substitute teachers to replace them, after which the district also put administrators back into the classroom to help alleviate the bad situation turned worse.
In a recent post released by The Ledger, teachers from the same Polk County School District (size = 100K students) added much needed details and also voiced concerns about all of this in the article that author Madison Fantozzi titled “Polk teachers: We are more than value-added model scores.”
Throughout this piece Fantozzi covers the story of Elizabeth Keep, a teacher who was “plucked from” the middle school in which she taught for 13 years, after which she was involuntarily placed at a district high school “just days before she was to report back to work.” She was one of 35 teachers moved from five schools in need of reform as based on schools’ value-added scores, although this was clearly done with no real concern or regard of the disruption this would cause these teachers, not to mention the students on the exiting and receiving ends. Likewise, and according to Keep, “If you asked students what they need, they wouldn’t say a teacher with a high VAM score…They need consistency and stability.” Apparently not. In Keep’s case, she “went from being the second most experienced person in [her middle school’s English] department…where she was department chair and oversaw the gifted program, to a [new, and never before] 10th- and 11th-grade English teacher” at the new high school to which she was moved.
As background, when Polk County School District officials presented turnaround plans to the State Board of Education last July, school board members “were most critical of their inability to move ‘unsatisfactory’ teachers out of the schools and ‘effective’ teachers in.” One board member, for example, expressed finding it “horrendous” that the district was “held hostage” by the extent to which the local union was protecting teachers from being moved as per their value-added scores. Referring to the union, and its interference in this “reform,” he accused the unions of “shackling” the districts and preventing its intended reforms. Note that the “effective” teachers who are to replace the “ineffective” ones can earn up to $7,500 in bonuses per year to help the “turnaround” the schools into which they enter.
Likewise, the state’s Commissioner of Education concurred saying that she also “wanted ‘unsatisfactory’ teachers out and ‘highly effective’ teachers in,” again, with effectiveness being defined by teachers’ value-added or lack thereof, even though (1) the teachers targeted only had one or two years of the three years of value-added data required by state statute, and even though (2) the district’s senior director of assessment, accountability and evaluation noted that, in line with a plethora of other research findings, teachers being evaluated using the state’s VAM have a 51% chance of changing their scores from one year to the next. This lack of reliability, as we know it, should outright prevent any such moves in that without some level of stability, valid inferences from which valid decisions are to be made cannot be drawn. It’s literally impossible.
Nonetheless, state board of education members “unanimously… threatened to take [all of the district’s poor performing] over or close them in 2017-18 if district officials [didn’t] do what [the Board said].” See also other tales of similar districts in the article available, again, here.
In Keep’s case, “her ‘unsatisfactory’ VAM score [that caused the district to move her, as] paired with her ‘highly effective’ in-class observations by her administrators brought her overall district evaluation to ‘effective’…[although she also notes that]…her VAM scores fluctuate because the state has created a moving target.” Regardless, Keep was notified “five days before teachers were due back to their assigned schools Aug. 8 [after which she was] told she had to report to a new school with a different start time that [also] disrupted her 13-year routine and family that shares one car.”
VAM-based chaos reigns, especially in Florida.
The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) recently released a circulated but not-yet internally or externally reviewed study titled “The Gap within the Gap: Using Longitudinal Data to Understand Income Differences in Student Achievement.” Note that we have covered NBER studies such as this in the past in this blog, so in all fairness and like I have noted in the past, this paper should also be critically consumed, as well as my interpretations of the authors’ findings.
Nevertheless, this study is authored by Katherine Michelmore — Assistant Professor of Public Administration and International Affairs at Syracuse University, and Susan Dynarski — Professor of Public Policy, Education, and Economics at the University of Michigan, and this study is entirely relevant to value-added models (VAMs). Hence, below I cover their key highlights and takeaways, as I see them. I should note up front, however, that the authors did not directly examine how the new measure of economic disadvantage that they introduce (see below) actually affects calculations of teacher-level value-added. Rather, they motivate their analyses by saying that calculating teacher value-added is one application of their analyses.
The background to their study is as follows: “Gaps in educational achievement between high- and low-income children are growing” (p. 1), but the data that are used to capture “high- and low-income” in the state of Michigan (i.e., the state in which their study took place) and many if not most other states throughout the US, capture “income” demographics in very rudimentary, blunt, and often binary ways (i.e., “yes” for students who are eligible to receive federally funded free-or-reduced lunches and “no” for the ineligible).
Consequently, in this study the authors “leverage[d] the longitudinal structure of these data sets to develop a new measure of persistent economic disadvantage” (p. 1), all the while defining “persistent economic disadvantage” by the extent to which students were “eligible for subsidized meals in every grade since kindergarten” (p. 8). Students “who [were] never eligible for subsidized meals during those grades [were] defined as never [being economically] disadvantaged” (p. 8), and students who were eligible for subsidized meals for variable years were defined as “transitorily disadvantaged” (p. 8). This all runs counter, however, to the binary codes typically used, again, across the nation.
Appropriately, then, their goal (among other things) was to see how a new measure they constructed to better measure and capture “persistent economic disadvantage” might help when calculating teacher-level value-added. They accordingly argue (among other things) that, perhaps, not accounting for persistent disadvantage might subsequently cause more biased value-added estimates “against teachers of [and perhaps schools educating] persistently disadvantaged children” (p. 3). This, of course, also depends on how persistently disadvantaged students are (non)randomly assigned to teachers.
With statistics like the following as also reported in their report: “Students [in Michigan] [persistently] disadvantaged by 8th grade were six times more likely to be black and four times more likely to be Hispanic, compared to those who were never disadvantaged,” their assertions speak volumes not only to the importance of their findings for educational policy, but also for the teachers and schools still being evaluated using value-added scores and the researchers investigating, criticizing, promoting, or even trying to make these models better (if that is possible). In short, though, teachers who are disproportionately teaching in urban areas with more students akin to their equally disadvantaged peers, might realize relatively more biased value-added estimates as a result.
For value-added purposes, then, it is clear that the assumptions that controlling for student disadvantage by using such basal indicators of current economic disadvantage is overly simplistic, and just using test scores to also count for this economic disadvantage (i.e., as promoted in most versions of the Education Value-Added Assessment System (EVAAS)) is likely worse. More specifically, the assumption that economic disadvantage also does not impact some students more than others over time, or over the period of data being used to capture value-added (typically 3-5 years of students’ test score data), is also highly susceptible. “[T]hat children who are persistently disadvantaged perform worse than those who are disadvantaged in only some grades” (p. 14) also violates another fundamental assumption that teachers’ effects are consistent over time for similar students who learn at more or less consistent rates over time, regardless of these and other demographics.
The bottom line here, then, is that the indicator that should be used instead of our currently used proxies for current economic disadvantage is the number of grades students spend in economic disadvantage. If the value-added indicator does not effectively account for the “negative, nearly linear relationship between [students’ test] scores and the number of grades spent in economic disadvantage” (p. 18), while controlling for other student demographics and school fixed effects, value-added estimates will likely be (even) more biased against teachers who teach these students as a result.
Otherwise, teachers who teach students with persistent economic disadvantages will likely have it worse (i.e., in terms of bias) than teachers who teach students with current economic disadvantages, teachers who teach students with economically disadvantaged in their current or past histories will have it worse than teachers who teach students without (m)any prior economic disadvantages, and so on.
Citation: Michelmore, K., & Dynarski, S. (2016). The gap within the gap: Using longitudinal data to understand income differences in student achievement. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). Retrieved from http://www.nber.org/papers/w22474
As you all likely recall, the American Federation of Teachers (AFT), joined by the Albuquerque Teachers Federation (ATF), last fall, filed a “Lawsuit in New Mexico Challenging [the] State’s Teacher Evaluation System.” Plaintiffs charged that the state’s teacher evaluation system, imposed on the state in 2012 by the state’s current Public Education Department (PED) Secretary Hanna Skandera (with value-added counting for 50% of teachers’ evaluation scores), was unfair, error-ridden, spurious, harming teachers, and depriving students of high-quality educators, among other claims (see the actual lawsuit here). Again, I’m serving as the expert witness on the side of the plaintiffs in this suit.
As you all likely also recall, in December of 2015, State District Judge David K. Thomson granted a preliminary injunction preventing consequences from being attached to the state’s teacher evaluation data. More specifically, Judge Thomson ruled that the state could proceed with “developing” and “improving” its teacher evaluation system, but the state was not to make any consequential decisions about New Mexico’s teachers using the data the state collected until the state (and/or others external to the state) could evidence to the court during another trial (initially set for April 2016, then postponed to October 2016, and likely to be postponed again) that the system is reliable, valid, fair, uniform, and the like (see prior post on this ruling here).
Well, many of you have (since these prior posts) written requesting updates regarding this lawsuit, and here is one as released jointly by the AFT and ATF. This accurately captures the current and ongoing situation:
September 23, 2016
Many of you will remember the classic Christmas program, Rudolph the Red Nose Reindeer, and how the terrible and menacing abominable snowman became harmless once his teeth were removed. This is how you should view the PED evaluation you recently received – a harmless abominable snowman.
The math is still wrong, the methodology deeply flawed, but the preliminary injunction achieved by our union, removed the teeth from PED’s evaluations, and so there is no reason to worry. As explained below, we will continue to fight these evaluations and will not rest until the PED institutes an evaluation system that is fair, meaningful, and consistently applied.
For all of you, who just got arbitrarily labeled by the PED in your summative evaluations, just remember, like the abominable snowman, these labels have no teeth, and your career is safe.
These evaluations, as you know, were the subject of our lawsuit filed in 2014. As a result of the Court’s order, the preliminary injunction, no negative consequences can result from your value-added scores.
In an effort to comply with the Court’s order, the PED announced in May it would be issuing new regulations. This did not happen, and it did not happen in June, in July, in August, or in September. The bottom line is the PED still has not issued new regulations – though it still promises that those regulations are coming soon. So much for accountability.
The trial on the old regulations, scheduled for October 24, has been postponed based upon the PED’s repetitive assertions that new regulations would be issued.
In addition, we have repeatedly asked the PED to provide their data, which they finally did, however it lacked the codebook necessary to meaningfully interpret the data. We view this as yet another stall tactic.
Soon, we will petition the Court for an order compelling PED to produce the documents it promised months ago. Our union’s lawyers and expert witnesses will use this data to critically analyze the PED’s claims and methodology … again.
Even though the PED has condensed the number of ways an educator can be evaluated in a false attempt to satisfy the Courts, the fact remains that value-added models are based on false math and highly inaccurate data. In addition to the PED’s information we have requested for the 2014-2015 evaluations, we have requested all data associated with the current 2015-2016 evaluations.
If our experts determine the summative evaluation scores are again, “based on fundamentally, and irreparably, flawed methodology which is further plagued by consistent and appalling data errors,” we will also challenge the 2015-2016 evaluations. If the PED ever releases new regulations, and we determine that they violate statute (again), we will challenge those regulations, as well.
Rest assured our union will not stop challenging the PED until we are satisfied they have adopted an evaluation system that is respectful of students and educators. We will keep you updated as we learn more information, including the release of new regulations and the rescheduled trial date.
Stephanie Ly Ellen Bernstein
President, AFT NM President, ATF
“A Concerned New Mexico Parent” sent me yet another blog entry for you all to stay apprised of the ongoing “situation” in New Mexico and the continuous escapades of the New Mexico Public Education Department (NMPED). See “A Concerned New Mexico Parent’s” prior posts here, here, and here, but in this one (s)he writes what follows:
Well, the NMPED is at it again.
They just released the teacher evaluation results for the 2015-2016 school year. And, the report and media press releases are a something.
Readers of this blog are familiar with my earlier documentation of the myriad varieties of scoring formulas used by New Mexico to evaluate its teachers. If I recall, I found something like 200 variations in scoring formulas [see his/her prior post on this here with an actual variation count at n=217].
However, a recent article published in the Albuquerque Journal indicates that, now according to the NMPED, “only three types of test scores are [being] used in the calculation: Partnership for Assessment of Readiness for College and Careers [PARCC], end-of-course exams, and the [state’s new] Istation literacy test.” [Recall from another article released last January that New Mexico’s Secretary of Education Hanna Skandera is also the head of the governing board for the PARCC test].
Further, the Albuquerque Journal article author reports that the “PED also altered the way it classifies teachers, dropping from 107 options to three. Previously, the system incorporated many combinations of criteria such as a teacher’s years in the classroom and the type of standardized test they administer.”
The new state-wide evaluation plan is also available in more detail here. Although I should also add that there has been no published notification of the radical changes in this plan. It was just simply and quietly posted on NMPED’s public website.
Important to note, though, is that for Group B teachers (all levels), the many variations documented previously have all been replaced by end-of-course (EOC) exams. Also note that for Group A teachers (all levels) the percentage assigned to the PARCC test has been reduced from 50% to 35%. (Oh, how the mighty have fallen …). The remaining 15% of the Group A score is to be composed of EOC exam scores.
There are only two small problems with this NMPED simplification.
First, in many districts, no EOC exams were given to Group B teachers in the 2015-2016 school year, and none were given in the previous year either. Any EOC scores that might exist were from a solitary administration of EOC exams three years previously.
Second, for Group A teachers whose scores formerly relied solely on the PARCC test for 50% of their score, no EOC exams were ever given.
Thus, NMPED has replaced their policy of evaluating teachers on the basis of students they don’t teach to this new policy of evaluating teachers on the basis of tests they never administered!
Well done, NMPED (not…)
Luckily, NMPED still cannot make any consequential decisions based on these data, again, until NMPED proves to the court that the consequential decisions that they would still very much like to make (e.g., employment, advancement and licensure decisions) are backed by research evidence. I know, interesting concept…
The American Prospect — a self-described “liberal intelligence” magazine — featured last week a question and answer, interview-based article with Jesse Rothstein — Professor of Economics at University of California – Berkeley — on “The Economic Consequences of Denying Teachers Tenure.” Rothstein is a great choice for this one in that indeed he is an economist, but one of a few, really, who is deep into the research literature and who, accordingly, has a balanced set of research-based beliefs about value-added models (VAMs), their current uses in America’s public schools, and what they can and cannot do (theoretically) to support school reform. He’s probably most famous for a study he conducted in 2009 about how the non-random, purposeful sorting of students into classrooms indeed biases (or distorts) value-added estimations, pretty much despite the sophistication of the statistical controls meant to block (or control for) such bias (or distorting effects). You can find this study referenced here, and a follow-up to this study here.
In this article, though, the interviewer — Rachel Cohen — interviews Jesse primarily about how in California a higher court recently reversed the Vergara v. California decision that would have weakened teacher employment protections throughout the state (see also here). “In 2014, in Vergara v. California, a Los Angeles County Superior Court judge ruled that a variety of teacher job protections worked together to violate students’ constitutional right to an equal education. This past spring, in a 3–0 decision, the California Court of Appeals threw this ruling out.”
Here are the highlights in my opinion, by question and answer, although there is much more information in the full article here:
Cohen: “Your research suggests that even if we got rid of teacher tenure, principals still wouldn’t fire many teachers. Why?”
Rothstein: “It’s basically because in most cases, there’s just not actually a long list of [qualified] people lining up to take the jobs; there’s a shortage of qualified teachers to hire.” In addition, “Lots of schools recognize it makes more sense to keep the teacher employed, and incentivize them with tenure…”I’ve studied this, and it’s basically economics 101. There is evidence that you get more people interested in teaching when the job is better, and there is evidence that firing teachers reduces the attractiveness of the job.”
Cohen: Your research suggests that even if we got rid of teacher tenure, principals still wouldn’t fire many teachers. Why?
Rothstein: It’s basically because in most cases, there’s just not actually a long list of people lining up to take the jobs; there’s a shortage of qualified teachers to hire. If you deny tenure to someone, that creates a new job opening. But if you’re not confident you’ll be able to fill it with someone else, that doesn’t make you any better off. Lots of schools recognize it makes more sense to keep the teacher employed, and incentivize them with tenure.
Cohen: “Aren’t most teachers pretty bad their first year? Are we denying them a fair shot if we make tenure decisions so soon?”
Rothstein: “Even if they’re struggling, you can usually tell if things will turn out to be okay. There is quite a bit of evidence for someone to look at.”
Cohen: “Value-added models (VAM) played a significant role in the Vergara trial. You’ve done a lot of research on these tools. Can you explain what they are?”
Rothstein: “[The] value-added model is a statistical tool that tries to use student test scores to come up with estimates of teacher effectiveness. The idea is that if we define teacher effectiveness as the impact that teachers have on student test scores, then we can use statistics to try to then tell us which teachers are good and bad. VAM played an odd role in the trial. The plaintiffs were arguing that now, with VAM, we have these new reliable measures of teacher effectiveness, so we should use them much more aggressively, and we should throw out the job statutes. It was a little weird that the judge took it all at face value in his decision.”
Cohen: “When did VAM become popular?”
Rothstein: “I would say it became a big deal late in the [George W.] Bush administration. That’s partly because we had new databases that we hadn’t had previously, so it was possible to estimate on a large scale. It was also partly because computers had gotten better. And then VAM got a huge push from the Obama administration.”
Cohen: “So you’re skeptical of VAM.”
Rothstein: “I think the metrics are not as good as the plaintiffs made them out to be. There are bias issues, among others.”
Cohen: “During the Vergara trials you testified against some of Harvard economist Raj Chetty’s VAM research, and the two of you have been going back and forth ever since. Can you describe what you two are arguing about?”
Rothstein: “Raj’s testimony at the trial was very focused on his work regarding teacher VAM. After the trial, I really dug in to understand his work, and I probed into some of his assumptions, and found that they didn’t really hold up. So while he was arguing that VAM showed unbiased results, and VAM results tell you a lot about a teacher’s long-term outcomes, I concluded that what his approach really showed was that value-added scores are moderately biased, and that they don’t really tell us one way or another about a teacher’s long-term outcomes” (see more about this debate here).
Cohen: “Could VAM be improved?”
Rothstein: “It may be that there is a way to use VAM to make a better system than we have now, but we haven’t yet figured out how to do that. Our first attempts have been trying to use them in not very intelligent ways.”
Cohen: “It’s been two years since the Vergara trial. Do you think anything’s changed?”
Rothstein: “I guess in general there’s been a little bit of a political walk-back from the push for VAM. And this retreat is not necessarily tied to the research evidence; sometimes these things just happen. But I’m not sure the trial court opinion would have come out the same if it were held today.”
Again, see more from this interview, also about teacher evaluation systems in general, job protections, and the like in the full article here.
Citation: Cohen, R. M. (2016, August 4). Q&A: The economic consequences of eenying teachers tenure. The American Prospect. Retrieved from http://prospect.org/article/qa-economic-consequences-denying-teachers-tenure
As we all likely know well by now, speakers for both parties during last and this weeks’ Republican and Democratic Conventions, respectively, spoke and in many cases spewed a number of exaggerated, misleading, and outright false claims about multiple areas of American public policy…educational policy included. Hence, many fact-checking journalists, websites, social mediaists, and the like, have since been trying to hold both parties accountable for their facts and make “the actual facts” more evident. For a funny video about all of this, actually, see HBO’s John Oliver’s most recent bit on “last week’s unsurprisingly surprising Republican convention” here (11 minutes) and some of their expressions of “feelings” as “facts.”
Fittingly, The 74 — an (allegedly) non-partisan, honest, and fact-based news site (ironically) covering America’s education system “in crisis,” and publishing articles “backed by investigation, expertise, and experience” and backed by Editor-in-Chief Campbell Brown — took on such a fact-checking challenge in an article senior staff writer Matt Burnum wrote: “Researchers: No Consensus Against Using Test Scores in Teacher Evaluations, Contra Democratic Platform.”
Apparently, what author Barnum actually did to justify the title and contents of his article, however, was (1) take the claim written into the 55-page “2016 Democratic Party Platform” document that: “We [the Democratic Party] oppose…the use of student test scores in teacher and principal evaluations, a practice which has been repeatedly rejected by researchers” (p. 33); then (2) generalize what being “repeatedly rejected by researchers” means, to inferring that a “consensus,” “wholesale,” and “categorical rejection” among researchers “that such scores should not be used whatsoever in evaluation” exists; then (3) proceed to ask a non-random or representative sample of nine researchers on the topic about whether, indeed, his deduced conclusion was true; to (4) ultimately claim that “the [alleged] suggestion that there is a scholarly consensus against using test scores in teacher evaluation is misleading.”
Misleading, rather, is Barnum’s framing of his entire piece, as Barnum twisted the original statement into something more alarmist, which apparently warranted his fact-checking, after which he engaged in a weak convenience-based investigation, with unsubstantiated findings ultimately making the headline of this subsequent article. It seems that those involved in reporting “the actual facts” also need some serious editing and fact-checking themselves in that, “The 74’s poll of just nine researchers [IS NOT]
may not be a representative sample of expert opinion,” whatsoever.
Nonetheless, the nine respondents (also without knowledge of who was contacted but did not respond, i.e., a response rate) included: Dan Goldhaber — Adjunct Professor of Education and Economics at the University of Washington, Bothell; Kirabo Jackson — Associate Professor of Education and Economics at Northwestern University; Cory Koedel — Associate Professor of Economics and Public Policy at the University of Missouri; Matthew Kraft — Assistant Professor of Education and Economics at Brown University; Susan Moore Johnson — Professor of Teacher Policy at Harvard University; Jesse Rothstein — Professor of Public Policy and Economics at the University of California, Berkeley; Matthew Steinberg — Assistant Professor of Educational Policy at the University of Pennsylvania; Katharine Strunk — Associate Professor of Educational Policy at the University of Southern California; Jim Wyckoff — Professor of Educational Policy at the University of Virginia. You can see what appear to be these researchers’ full responses to Barnum’s undisclosed solicitation at the bottom of this article, available again here, noting that the opinions of these nine are individually important as I too would value some of these nine as among (but not representative of) the experts in the area of research (see a fuller list of 37 such experts here, 2/3rds of whom are listed above).
Regardless, and assuming that Barnum’s original misinterpretation was correct, I think how Katharine Strunk put it is likely more representative of the group of researchers on this topic as a whole as based on the research: “I think the research suggests that we need multiple measures — test scores [depending on the extent to which evidence supports low- and more importantly high-stakes use], observations, and others – to rigorously and fairly evaluate teachers.” Likewise, how Jesse Rothstein framed his response, in my opinion, is another takeaway for those looking for what is more likely a more accurate and representative statement on this hypothetical consensus: “the weight of the evidence, and the weight of expert opinion, points to the conclusion that we haven’t figured out ways to use test scores in teacher evaluations that yield benefits greater than costs.”
With that being said, what is likely most the “fact” desired in this particular instance is that “the use of student test scores in teacher and principal evaluations, [IS] a practice which has been repeatedly rejected by researchers.” But it has also been disproportionately promoted by researchers with disciplinary backgrounds in economics (although this is not always the case), and disproportionately rejected so by those with disciplinary backgrounds in education, educational policy, educational measurement and statistics, and the like (although this is not always the case). The bottom line is that reaching a consensus in this area of research is much more difficult than Barnum and others might otherwise assume.
Should one really want to “factually” answer such a question, (s)he would have to more carefully: (1) define the problem and subsequent research question (e.g., the platform never claimed in the first place that said “consensus” existed), (2) engage in background research to (3) methodically define the population of researchers from which (4) the research sample is to be drawn to adequately represent the population, after which (5) an appropriate response rate is to be secured. If there are methodological weaknesses in any of these steps, the research exercise should likely stop, as Barnum should have during step #1 in this case here.
As per a recent article by Chalkbeat Colorado, “Denver Public Schools [is] Set to Strip Nearly 50 Teachers of Tenure Protections after [two-years of consecutive] Poor Evaluations.” This will make Denver Public Schools — Colorado’s largest school district — the district with the highest relative proportion of teachers to lose tenure, which demotes teachers to probationary status, which also causes them to lose their due process rights.
- The majority of the 47 teachers — 26 of them — are white. Another 14 are Latino, four are African-American, two are multi-racial and one is Asian.
- Thirty-one of the 47 teachers set to lose tenure — or 66 percent — teach in “green” or “blue” schools, the two highest ratings on Denver’s color-coded School Performance Framework. Only three — or 6 percent — teach in “red” schools, the lowest rating.
- Thirty-eight of the 47 teachers — or 81 percent — teach at schools where more than half of the students qualify for federally subsidized lunches, an indicator of poverty.
Elsewhere, in Douglas County 24, in Aurora 12, in Cherry Creek one, and in Jefferson County, the state’s second largest district, zero teachers teachers are set to lose their tenure status. This all occurred provided a sweeping educator effectiveness law — Senate Bill 191 — passed throughout Colorado six years ago. As per this law, “at least 50 percent of a teacher’s evaluation [must] be based on student academic growth.”
“Because this is the first year teachers can lose that status…[however]…officials said it’s difficult to know why the numbers differ from district to district.” This, of course, is an issue with fairness whereby a court, for example, could find that if a teacher is teaching in District X versus District Y, and (s)he had an different probability of losing tenure due only to the District in which (s)he taught, this could be quite easily argued as an arbitrary component of the law, not to mention an arbitrary component of its implementation. If I was advising these districts on these matters, I would certainly advise them to tread lightly.
However, apparently many districts throughout Colorado use a state-developed and endorsed model to evaluate their teachers, but Denver uses its own model; hence, this would likely take some of the pressure off of the state, should this end up in court, and place it more so upon the district. That is, the burden of proof would likely rest on Denver Public School officials to evidence that they are no only complying with the state law but that they are doing so in sound, evidence-based, and rational/reasonable ways.
Citation: Amar, M. (2016, July 15). Denver Public Schools set to strip nearly 50 teachers of tenure protections after poor evaluations. Chalkbeat Colorado. Retrieved from http://www.chalkbeat.org/posts/co/2016/07/14/denver-public-schools-set-to-strip-nearly-50-teachers-of-tenure-protections-after-poor-evaluations/#.V5Yryq47Tof