Time to Organize in Florida

A few weeks ago, a Florida reporter reached out to me for information about the nation’s value-added models (VAMs), but also as specific to the state of Florida. It seems that teachers in Florida were (and perhaps still are) being removed from teaching in Florida schools if their state-calculated, teacher-level VAM scores deemed them as teachers who “needed improvement” or were “unsatisfactory.”

More specifically, the state of Florida is using its state-level VAM to rate teachers’ VAM-based performance, using state exams in mathematics and language arts. If the teachers ultimately deemed in need of improvement or unsatisfactory teach in one of the state’s “turnaround” schools (i.e., a school that is required by the state to have a turnaround plan in place), those teachers are to be removed from the school and placed elsewhere. This is happening by state law, whereby the law dictates that no turnaround school may have a higher percentage of low value-added teachers than the district as a whole, which the state has apparently interpreted that to mean no low value-added teachers in these schools, at all.

Of course, some of the issues being raised throughout the state are not only about the VAMs themselves, as well as the teachers being displaced (e.g., two weeks or so after the school year resumed), but also about how all of this has caused other disruptions (e.g., students losing their teachers a few weeks after the beginning of the school year). Related, many principals have rejected these on-goings, expressly noting that they want to keep many if not most/all of the teachers being moved from their schools, as “valued” by them. I have also heard directly from a few Florida principals/school administrators about these same matters. See other articles about this here and here.

Hence, I’m writing this blog post to not only let others know about what is going on in Florida right now, despite the fact that the rest of the nation is (overall) taking some major steps back away from the uses (and abuses) of VAMs, especially in such high-stakes ways.

But I’m also writing this blog post to (hopefully) inspire those in Florida (including teachers, principals, etc.) to organize. Organize yourselves, perhaps with the assistance and guidance of your unions, professional organizations, legal groups (perhaps, also as affiliated), and the like. What is happening in Florida, as per state law, can very likely be legally challenged.

Overall, we (including many others in similar court cases in New Mexico, New York, and Texas) did quite well, overall, in the courts fighting the unjustifiable and indefensible uses of VAMs for similar purpose. Hence, I truly believe it is just a matter of time, with some organizing, that the teachers in Florida also realize some relief. There are also many of us out there who are more than ready and willing to help.

LA Times Value-Added Reporters: Where Are They Now

In two of my older posts (here and here), I wrote about the Los Angeles Times and its controversial move to solicit Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD) students’ test scores via an open-records request, calculate LAUSD teachers’ value-added scores themselves, and then publish thousands of LAUSD teachers’ value-added scores along with their “effectiveness” classifications on their Los Angeles Teacher Ratings website. They did this, repeatedly, since 2010, and they did this all despite the major research-based issues surrounding teachers’ value-added estimates (that hopefully followers of this blog know at least somewhat well).

This is also of frustration for me since the authors of the initial articles (Jason Strong and Jason Felch) contacted me back in 2011 regarding whether what they were doing was appropriate, valid, and fair. Despite about one hour’s worth of strong warnings against doing so, Felch and Song thanked me for my time and moved forward regardless. See also others’ concerns about them doing this here, here, here, and here, for example.

Well, Jason Strong now works as communications director for Eli Broad’s Great Public Schools Now, which has as its primary goal to grow charter schools and get 50% of LA students into charters (see here). Jason Felch was fired in 2014 for writing a story about unreported sexual assault violations at Occidental College, and having an “inappropriate relationship” with a source for this story (see here).

So Jason Song and Jason Felch humiliated thousands of LA teachers and possibly contributed to the suicide of one, fifth grade teacher Rigoberto Ruelas, who jumped off a bridge after they publicly labeled him mediocre.

What goes around, comes around…

Learning from What Doesn’t Work in Teacher Evaluation

One of my doctoral students — Kevin Close — and I just had a study published in the practitioner journal Phi Delta Kappan that I wanted to share out with all of you, especially before the study is no longer open-access or free (see full study as currently available here). As the title indicates, the study is about how states, school districts, and schools can “Learn from What Doesn’t Work in Teacher Evaluation,” given an analysis that the two of us conducted of all documents pertaining to the four teacher evaluation and value-added model (VAM)-centered lawsuits in which I have been directly involved, and that I have also covered in this blog. These lawsuits include Lederman v. King in New York (see here), American Federation of Teachers et al. v. Public Education Department in New Mexico (see here), Houston Federation of Teachers v. Houston Independent School District in Texas (see here), and Trout v. Knox County Board of Education in Tennessee (see here).

Via this analysis we set out to comb through the legal documents to identify the strongest objections, as also recognized by the courts in these lawsuits, to VAMs as teacher measurement and accountability strategies. “The lessons to be learned from these cases are both important and timely” given that “[u]nder the Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA), local education leaders once again have authority to decide for themselves how to assess teachers’ work.”

The most pertinent and also common issues as per these cases were as follows:

(1) Inconsistencies in teachers’ VAM-based estimates from one year to the next that are sometimes “wildly different.” Across these lawsuits, issues with reliability were very evident, whereas teachers classified as “effective” one year were either theorized or demonstrated to have around a 25%-59% chance of being classified as “ineffective” the next year, or vice versa, with other permutations also possible. As per our profession’s Standards for Educational and Psychological Testing, reliability should, rather, be observed whereby VAM estimates of teacher effectiveness are more or less consistent over time, from one year to the next, regardless of the type of students and perhaps subject areas that teachers teach.

(2) Bias in teachers’ VAM-based estimates were also of note, whereby documents suggested or evidenced that bias, or rather biased estimates of teachers’ actual effects does indeed exist (although this area was also of most contention and dispute). Specific to VAMs, since teachers are not randomly assigned the students they teach, whether their students are invariably more or less motivated, smart, knowledgeable, or capable can bias students’ test-based data, and teachers’ test-based data when aggregated. Court documents, although again not without counterarguments, suggested that VAM-based estimates are sometimes biased, especially when relatively homogeneous sets of students (i.e., English Language Learners (ELLs), gifted and special education students, free-or-reduced lunch eligible students) are non-randomly concentrated into schools, purposefully placed into classrooms, or both. Research suggests that this also sometimes happens regardless of the the sophistication of the statistical controls used to block said bias.

(3) The gaming mechanisms in play within teacher evaluation systems in which VAMs play a key role, or carry significant evaluative weight, were also of legal concern and dispute. That administrators sometimes inflate the observational ratings of their teachers whom they want to protect, while simultaneously offsetting the weight the VAMs sometimes carry was of note, as was the inverse. That administrators also sometimes lower teachers’ ratings to better align them with their “more objective” VAM counterparts were also at issue. “So argued the plaintiffs in the Houston and Tennessee lawsuits, for example. In those systems, school leaders appear to have given precedence to VAM scores, adjusting their classroom observations to match them. In both cases, administrators admitted to doing so, explaining that they sensed pressure to ensure that their ‘subjective’ classroom ratings were in sync with the VAM’s ‘objective’ scores.” Both sets of behavior distort the validity (or “truthfulness”) of any teacher evaluation system and are in violation of the same, aforementioned Standards for Educational and Psychological Testing that call for VAM scores and observation ratings to be kept separate. One indicator should never be adjusted to offset or to fit the other.

(4) Transparency, or the lack thereof, was also a common issue across cases. Transparency, which can be defined as the extent to which something is accessible and readily capable of being understood, pertains to whether VAM-based estimates are accessible and make sense to those at the receiving ends. “Not only should [teachers] have access to [their VAM-based] information for instructional purposes, but if they believe their evaluations to be unfair, they should be able to see all of the relevant data and calculations so that they can defend themselves.” In no case was this more legally pertinent than in Houston Federation of Teachers v. Houston Independent School District in Texas. Here, the presiding judge ruled that teachers did have “legitimate claims to see how their scores were calculated. Concealing this information, the judge ruled, violated teachers’ due process protections under the 14th Amendment (which holds that no state — or in this case organization — shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process). Given this precedent, it seems likely that teachers in other states and districts will demand transparency as well.”

In the main article (here) we also discuss what states are now doing to (hopefully) improve upon their teacher evaluation systems in terms of using multiple measures to help to evaluate teachers more holistically. We emphasize the (in)formative versus the summative and high-stakes functions of such systems, and allowing teachers to take ownership over such systems in their development and implementation. I will leave you all to read the full article (here) for these details.

In sum, though, when rethinking states’ teacher evaluation systems, especially given the new liberties afforded to states via the Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA), educators, education leaders, policymakers, and the like would do well to look to the past for guidance on what not to do — and what to do better. These legal cases can certainly inform such efforts.

Reference: Close, K., & Amrein-Beardsley, A. (2018). Learning from what doesn’t work in teacher evaluation. Phi Delta Kappan, 100(1), 15-19. Retrieved from http://www.kappanonline.org/learning-from-what-doesnt-work-in-teacher-evaluation/

Effects of the Los Angeles Times Prior Publications of Teachers’ Value-Added Scores

In one of my older posts (here), I wrote about the Los Angeles Times and its controversial move to solicit Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD) students’ test scores via an open-records request, calculate LAUSD teachers’ value-added scores themselves, and then publish thousands of LAUSD teachers’ value-added scores along with their “effectiveness” classifications (e.g., least effective, less effective, average, more effective, and most effective) on their Los Angeles Teacher Ratings website. They did this, repeatedly, since 2010, and they have done this all the while despite the major research-based issues surrounding teachers’ value-added estimates (that hopefully followers of this blog know at least somewhat well). This is also of professional frustration for me since the authors of the initial articles and the creators of the searchable website (Jason Felch and Jason Strong) contacted me back in 2011 regarding whether what they were doing was appropriate, valid, and fair. Despite my strong warnings against it, Felch and Song thanked me for my time and moved forward.

Just yesterday, the National Education Policy Center (NEPC) at the University of Colorado – Boulder, published a Newsletter in which authors answer the following question, as taken from the Newsletter’s title: “Whatever Happened with the Los Angeles Times’ Decision to Publish Teachers’ Value-Added Scores?” Here is what they found, by summarizing one article and two studies on the topic, although you can also certainly read the full report here.

  • Publishing the scores meant already high-achieving students were assigned to the classrooms of higher-rated teachers the next year, [found a study in the peer-reviewed Economics of Education Review]. That could be because affluent or well-connected parents were able to pull strings to get their kids assigned to those top teachers, or because those teachers pushed to teach the highest-scoring students. In other words, the academically rich got even richer — an unintended consequence of what could be considered a journalistic experiment in school reform.
  • The decision to publish the scores led to: (1) A temporary increase in teacher turnover; (2) Improvements
    in value-added scores; and (3) No impact on local housing prices.
  • The Los Angeles Times’ analysis erroneously concluded that there was no relationship between value-added scores and levels of teacher education and experience.
  • It failed to account for the fact that teachers are non-randomly assigned to classes in ways that benefit some and disadvantage others.
  • It generated results that changed when Briggs and Domingue tweaked the underlying statistical model [i.e., yielding different value-estimates and classifications for the same teachers].
  • It produced “a significant number of false positives (teachers rated as effective who are really average), and false negatives (teachers rated as ineffective who are really average).”

After the Los Angeles Times’ used a different approach in 2011, Catherine Durso found:

  • Class composition varied so much that comparisons of value-added scores of two teachers were only valid if both teachers are assigned students with similar characteristics.
  • Annual fluctuations in results were so large that they lead to widely varying conclusions from one year to the next for the same teacher.
  • There was strong evidence that results were often due to the teaching environment, not just the teacher.
  • Some teachers’ scores were based on very little data.

In sum, while “[t]he debate over publicizing value-added scores, so fierce in 2010, has since died down to
a dull roar,” more states (e.g., like in New York and Virginia), organizations (e.g., like Matt Barnum’s Chalbeat), and news outlets (e.g., the Los Angeles Times has apparently discontinued this practice, although their website is still live) need to take a stand against or prohibit the publications of individual teachers’ value-added results from hereon out. As I noted to Jason Felch and Jason Strong a long time ago, this IS simply bad practice.

Much of the Same in Louisiana

As I wrote into a recent post: “…it seems that the residual effects of the federal governments’ former [teacher evaluation reform policies and] efforts are still dominating states’ actions with regards to educational accountability.” In other words, many states are still moving forward, more specifically in terms of states’ continued reliance on the use of value-added models (VAMs) for increased teacher accountability purposes, regardless of the passage of the Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA).

Related, three articles were recently published online (here, here, and here) about how in Louisiana, the state’s old and controversial teacher evaluation system as based on VAMs is resuming after a four-year hiatus. It was put on hold when the state was in the process of adopting The Common Core.

This, of course, has serious implications for the approximately 50,000 teachers throughout the state, or the unknown proportion of them who are now VAM-eligible, believed to be around 15,000 (i.e., approximately 30% which is inline with other state trends).

While the state’s system has been partly adjusted, whereas 50% of a teacher’s evaluation was to be based on growth in student achievement over time using VAMs, and the new system has reduced this percentage down to 35%, now teachers of mathematics, English, science, and social studies are also to be held accountable using VAMs. The other 50% of these teachers’ evaluation scores are to be assessed using observations with 15% based on student learning targets (a.k.a., student learning objectives (SLOs)).

Evaluation system output are to be used to keep teachers from earning tenure, or to cause teachers to lose the tenure they might already have.

Among other controversies and issues of contention noted in these articles (see again here, here, and here), one of note (highlighted here) is also that now, “even after seven years”… the state is still “unable to truly explain or provide the actual mathematical calculation or formula’ used to link test scores with teacher ratings. ‘This obviously lends to the distrust of the entire initiative among the education community.”

A spokeswoman for the state, however, countered the transparency charge noting that the VAM formula has been on the state’s department of education website, “and updated annually, since it began in 2012.” She did not provide a comment about how to adequately explain the model, perhaps because she could not either.

Just because it might be available does not mean it is understandable and, accordingly, usable. This we have come to know from administrators, teachers, and yes, state-level administrators in charge of these models (and their adoption and implementation) for years. This is, indeed, one of the largest criticisms of VAMs abound.

One Florida District Kisses VAMs Goodbye

I recently wrote about how, in Louisiana, the state is reverting back to its value-added model (VAM)-based teacher accountability system after its four year hiatus (see here). The post titled “Much of the Same in Louisiana” likely did not come as a surprise to teachers there in that the state (like most other states in the sunbelt, excluding California) have a common and also perpetual infatuation with such systems, whether they be based on student-level or teacher-level accountability.

Well, at least one school district in Florida is kissing the state’s six-year infatuation with its VAM-based teacher accountability system goodbye. I could have invoked a much more colorful metaphor here, but let’s just go with something along the lines of a sophomoric love affair.

According to a recent article in the Tampa Bay Times (see here), “[u]sing new authority from the [state] Legislature, the Citrus County School Board became the first in the state to stop using VAM, citing its unfairness and opaqueness…[with this]…decision…expected to prompt other boards to action.”

That’s all the article has to offer on the topic, but let’s all hope others, in Florida and beyond, do follow.

A “Next Generation” Vision for School, Teacher, and Student Accountability

Within a series of prior posts (see, for example, here and here), I have written about what the Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA), passed in December of 2015, means for the U.S., or more specifically states’ school and teacher evaluation systems as per the federal government’s prior mandates requiring their use of growth and value-added models (VAMs).

Related, states were recently (this past May) required to submit to the federal government their revised school and teacher evaluation plans, post ESSA, given how they have changed, or not. While I have a doctoral student currently gathering updated teacher evaluation data, state-by-state, and our preliminary findings indicate that “things” have not (yet) changed much post ESSA, at least at the teacher level of focus in this study and except for in a few states (e.g., Connecticut, Oklahoma), states still have the liberties to change that which they do on both ends (i.e., school and teacher accountability).

Recently, a colleague recently shared with me a study titled “Next Generation Accountability: A Vision for School Improvement Under ESSA” that warrants coverage here, in hopes that states are still “out there” trying to reform their school and teacher evaluation systems, of course, for the better. While the document was drafted by folks coming from the aforementioned state of Oklahoma, who are also affiliated with the Learning Policy Institute, it is important to note that the document was also vetted by some “heavy hitters” in this line of research including, but not limited to, David C. Berliner (Arizona State University), Peter W. Cookson Jr. (American Institutes for Research (AIR)), Linda Darling-Hammond (Stanford University), and William A. Firestone (Rutgers University).

As per ESSA, states are to have increased opportunities “to develop innovative strategies for advancing equity, measuring success, and developing cycles of continuous improvement” while using “multiple measures to assess school and student performance” (p. iii). Likewise, the authors of this report state that “A broader spectrum of indicators,
going well beyond a summary of annual test performance, seems necessary to account transparently for performance and assign responsibility for improvement.”

Here are some of their more specific recommendations that I found of value for blog followers:

  • The continued use of a single composite indicator to reduce and then sort teachers or schools by their overall effectiveness or performance (e.g., using teacher “effectiveness” categories or school A–F letter grades) is myopic, to say the least. This is because doing this (a) misses all that truly “matters,” including  multidimensional concepts and (non)cognitive competencies we want students to know and to be able to do, not captured by large-scale tests; and (b) inhibits the usefulness of what may be informative, stand-alone data (i.e., as taken from “multiple measures” individually) once these data are reduced and then collapsed so that they can be used for hierarchical categorizations and rankings. This also (c) very much trivializes the multiple causes of low achievement, also of importance and in much greater need of attention.
  • Accordingly, “Next Generation” accountability systems should include “a broad palette of functionally significant indicators to replace [such] single composite indicators [as this] will likely be regarded as informational rather than controlling, thereby motivating stakeholders to action” (p. ix). Stakeholders should be defined in the following terms…
  • “Next Generation” accountability systems should incorporate principles of “shared accountability,” whereby educational responsibility and accountability should be “distributed across system components and not foisted upon any one group of actors or stakeholders” (p. ix). “[E]xerting pressure on stakeholders who do not have direct control over [complex educational] elements is inappropriate and worse, harmful” (p. ix). Accordingly, the goal of “shared accountability” is to “create an accountability environment in which all participants [including governmental organizations] recognize their obligations and commitments in relation to each other” (p. ix) and their collective educational goals.
  • To facilitate this, “Next Generation” information systems should be designed and implemented in order to service the “dual reporting needs of compliance with federal mandates and the particular improvement needs of a state’s schools,” while also addressing “the different information needs of state, district, school site
    leadership, teachers, and parents” (p. ix). Data may include, at minimum, data on school resources, processes, outcomes, and other nuanced indicators, and this information must be made transparent and accessible in order for all types of data users to be responsive, holistically and individually (e.g, at school or classroom levels). The formative functions of such “Next Generation” informational systems, accordingly, take priority, at least for initial terms, until informational data can be used to, with priority, “identify and transform schools in catastrophic failure” (p. ix).
  • Related, all test- or other educational measurement-related components of states’ “Next Generation” statutes and policies should adhere to the Standards for Educational and Psychological Testing, and more specifically their definitions of reliability, validity, bias, fairness, and the like. Statutes and policies should also be written “in the least restrictive and prescriptive terms possible to allow for [continous] corrective action and improvement” (p. x).
  • Finally, “Next Generation” accountability systems should adhere to the following five essentials: “(a) state, district, and school leaders must create a system-wide culture grounded in “learning to improve;” (b) learning to improve using [the aforementioned informational systems also] necessitates the [overall] development of [students’] strong pedagogical data-literacy skills; (c) resources in addition to funding—including time, access to expertise, and collaborative opportunities—should be prioritized for sustaining these ongoing improvement efforts; (d) there must be a coherent structure of state-level support for learning to improve, including the development of a strong Longitudinal Data System (LDS) infrastructure; and (e) educator labor market policy in some states may need adjustment to support the above elements” (p. x).

To read more, please access the full report here.

In sum, “Next Generation” accountability systems aim at “a loftier goal—universal college and career readiness—a goal that current accountability systems were not designed to achieve. To reach this higher level, next generation accountability must embrace a wider vision, distribute trustworthy performance information, and build support infrastructure, while eliciting the assent, support, and enthusiasm of citizens and educators” (p. vii).

As briefly noted prior, “a few states have been working to put more supportive, humane accountability systems in place, but others remain stuck in a compliance mindset that undermines their ability to design effective accountability systems” (p. vii). Perhaps (or perhaps likely) this is because for the past decade or so states invested so much time, effort, and money to “reforming” their prior teacher evaluations systems as formerly required by the federal government. This included investments in states’ growth models of VAMs, onto which many/most states seem to be holding firm.

Hence, while it seems that the residual effects of the federal governments’ former efforts are still dominating states’ actions with regards to educational accountability, hopefully some states can at least begin to lead the way to what will likely yield the educational reform…still desired…

The New York Times on “The Little Known Statistician” Who Passed

As many of you may recall, I wrote a post last March about the passing of William L. Sanders at age 74. Sanders developed the Education Value-Added Assessment System (EVAAS) — the value-added model (VAM) on which I have conducted most of my research (see, for example, here and here) and the VAM at the core of most of the teacher evaluation lawsuits in which I have been (or still am) engaged (see here, here, and here).

Over the weekend, though, The New York Times released a similar piece about Sanders’s passing, titled “The Little-Known Statistician Who Taught Us to Measure Teachers.” Because I had multiple colleagues and blog followers email me (or email me about) this article, I thought I would share it out with all of you, with some additional comments, of course, but also given the comments I already made in my prior post here.

First, I will start by saying that the title of this article is misleading in that what this “little-known” statistician contributed to the field of education was hardly “little” in terms of its size and impact. Rather, Sanders and his associates at SAS Institute Inc. greatly influenced our nation in terms of the last decade of our nation’s educational policies, as largely bent on high-stakes teacher accountability for educational reform. This occurred in large part due to Sanders’s (and others’) lobbying efforts when the federal government ultimately choose to incentivize and de facto require that all states hold their teachers accountable for their value-added, or lack thereof, while attaching high-stakes consequences (e.g., teacher termination) to teachers’ value-added estimates. This, of course, was to ensure educational reform. This occurred at the federal level, as we all likely know, primarily via Race to the Top and the No Child Left Behind Waivers essentially forced upon states when states had to adopt VAMs (or growth models) to also reform their teachers, and subsequently their schools, in order to continue to receive the federal funds upon which all states still rely.

It should be noted, though, that we as a nation have been relying upon similar high-stakes educational policies since the late 1970s (i.e., for now over 35 years); however, we have literally no research evidence that these high-stakes accountability policies have yielded any of their intended effects, as still perpetually conceptualized (see, for example, Nevada’s recent legislative ruling here) and as still advanced via large- and small-scale educational policies (e.g., we are still A Nation At Risk in terms of our global competitiveness). Yet, we continue to rely on the logic in support of such “carrot and stick” educational policies, even with this last decade’s teacher- versus student-level “spin.” We as a nation could really not be more ahistorical in terms of our educational policies in this regard.

Regardless, Sanders contributed to all of this at the federal level (that also trickled down to the state level) while also actively selling his VAM to state governments as well as local school districts (i.e., including the Houston Independent School District in which teacher plaintiffs just won a recent court ruling against the Sanders value-added system here), and Sanders did this using sets of (seriously) false marketing claims (e.g., purchasing and using the EVAAS will help “clear [a] path to achieving the US goal of leading the world in college completion by the year 2020”). To see two empirical articles about the claims made to sell Sanders’s EVAAS system, the research non-existent in support of each of the claims, and the realities of those at the receiving ends of this system (i.e., teachers) as per their experiences with each of the claims, see here and here.

Hence, to assert that what this “little known” statistician contributed to education was trivial or inconsequential is entirely false. Thankfully, with the passage of the Every Student Succeeds Act” (ESSA) the federal government came around, in at least some ways. While not yet acknowledging how holding teachers accountable for their students’ test scores, while ideal, simply does not work (see the “Top Ten” reasons why this does not work here), at least the federal government has given back to the states the authority to devise, hopefully, some more research-informed educational policies in these regards (I know….).

Nonetheless, may he rest in peace (see also here), perhaps also knowing that his forever stance of “[making] no apologies for the fact that his methods were too complex for most of the teachers whose jobs depended on them to understand,” just landed his EVAAS in serious jeopardy in court in Houston (see here) given this stance was just ruled as contributing to the violation of teachers’ Fourteenth Amendment rights (i.e., no state or in this case organization shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process [emphasis added]).

Rest in Peace, EVAAS Developer William L. Sanders

Over the last 3.5 years since I developed this blog, I have written many posts about one particular value-added model (VAM) – the Education Value-Added Assessment System (EVAAS), formerly known as the Tennessee Value-Added Assessment System (TVAAS), now known by some states as the TxVAAS in Texas, the PVAAS in Pennsylvania, and also known as the generically-named EVAAS in states like Ohio, North Carolina, and South Carolina (and many districts throughout the nation). It is this model on which I have conducted most of my research (see, for example, the first piece I published about this model here, in which most of the claims I made still stand, although EVAAS modelers disagreed here). And it is this model that is at the source of the majority of the teacher evaluation lawsuits in which I have been or still am currently engaged (see, for example, details about the Houston lawsuit here, the former Tennessee lawsuit here, and the new Texas lawsuit here, although the model is more peripheral in this particular case).

Anyhow, the original EVAAS model (i.e, the TVAAS) was originally developed by a man named William L. Sanders who ultimately sold it to SAS Institute Inc. that now holds all rights to the proprietary model. See, for example, here. See also examples of prior posts about Sanders here, here, here, here, here, and here. See also examples of prior posts about the EVAAS here, here, here, here, here, and here.

It is William L. Sanders who just passed away and we sincerely hope may rest in peace.

Sanders had a bachelors degree in animal science and a doctorate in statistics and quantitative genetics. As an adjunct professor and agricultural statistician in the college of business at the University of Knoxville, Tennessee, he developed in the late 1980s his TVAAS.

Sanders thought that educators struggling with student achievement in the state should “simply” use more advanced statistics, similar to those used when modeling genetic and reproductive trends among cattle, to measure growth, hold teachers accountable for that growth, and solve the educational measurement woes facing the state of Tennessee at the time. It was to be as simple as that…. I should also mention that given this history, not surprisingly, Tennessee was one of the first states to receive Race to the Top funds to the tune of $502 million to further advance this model; hence, this has also contributed to this model’s popularity across the nation.

Nonetheless, Sanders passed away this past Thursday, March 16, 2017, from natural causes in Columbia, Tennessee. As per his obituary here,

  • He was most well-known for developing “a method used to measure a district, school, and teacher’s effect on student performance by tracking the year-to-year progress of students against themselves over their school career with various teachers’ classes.”
  • He “stood for a hopeful view that teacher effectiveness dwarfs all other factors as a predictor of student academic growth…[challenging]…decades of assumptions that student family life, income, or ethnicity has more effect on student learning.”
  • He believed, in the simplest of terms, “that educational influence matters and teachers matter most.”

Of course, we have much research evidence to counter these claims, but for now we will just leave all of this at that. Again, may he rest in peace.

David Berliner on The Purported Failure of America’s Schools

My primary mentor, David Berliner (Regents Professor at Arizona State University (ASU)) wrote, yesterday, a blog post for the Equity Alliance Blog (also at ASU) on “The Purported Failure of America’s Schools, and Ways to Make Them Better” (click here to access the original blog post). See other posts about David’s scholarship on this blog here, here, and here. See also one of our best blog posts that David also wrote here, about “Why Standardized Tests Should Not Be Used to Evaluate Teachers (and Teacher Education Programs).”

In sum, for many years David has been writing “about the lies told about the poor performance of our students and the failure of our schools and teachers.” For example, he wrote one of the education profession’s all time classics and best sellers: The Manufactured Crisis: Myths, Fraud, And The Attack On America’s Public Schools (1995). If you have not read it, you should! All educators should read this book, on that note and in my opinion, but also in the opinion of many other iconic educational scholars throughout the U.S. (Paufler, Amrein-Beardsley, Hobson, under revision for publication).

While the title of this book accurately captures its contents, more specifically it “debunks the myths that test scores in America’s schools are falling, that illiteracy is rising, and that better funding has no benefit. It shares the good news about public education.” I’ve found the contents of this book to still be my best defense when others with whom I interact attack America’s public schools, as often misinformed and perpetuated by many American politicians and journalists.

In this blog post David, once again, debunks many of these myths surrounding America’s public schools using more up-to-date data from international tests, our country’s National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP), state-level SAT and ACT scores, and the like. He reminds us of how student characteristics “strongly influence the [test] scores obtained by the students” at any school and, accordingly, “strongly influence” or bias these scores when used in any aggregate form (e.g., to hold teachers, schools, districts, and states accountable for their students’ performance).

He reminds us that “in the US, wealthy children attending public schools that serve the wealthy are competitive with any nation in the world…[but in]…schools in which low-income students do not achieve well, [that are not competitive with many nations in the world] we find the common correlates of poverty: low birth weight in the neighborhood, higher than average rates of teen and single parenthood, residential mobility, absenteeism, crime, and students in need of special education or English language instruction.” These societal factors explain poor performance much more (i.e., more variance explained) than any school-level, and as pertinent to this blog, teacher-level factor (e.g., teacher quality as measured by large-scale standardized test scores).

In this post David reminds us of much, much more, that we need to remember and also often recall in defense of our public schools and in support of our schools’ futures (e.g., research-based notes to help “fix” some of our public schools).

Again, please do visit the original blog post here to read more.