Learning from What Doesn’t Work in Teacher Evaluation

One of my doctoral students — Kevin Close — and I just had a study published in the practitioner journal Phi Delta Kappan that I wanted to share out with all of you, especially before the study is no longer open-access or free (see full study as currently available here). As the title indicates, the study is about how states, school districts, and schools can “Learn from What Doesn’t Work in Teacher Evaluation,” given an analysis that the two of us conducted of all documents pertaining to the four teacher evaluation and value-added model (VAM)-centered lawsuits in which I have been directly involved, and that I have also covered in this blog. These lawsuits include Lederman v. King in New York (see here), American Federation of Teachers et al. v. Public Education Department in New Mexico (see here), Houston Federation of Teachers v. Houston Independent School District in Texas (see here), and Trout v. Knox County Board of Education in Tennessee (see here).

Via this analysis we set out to comb through the legal documents to identify the strongest objections, as also recognized by the courts in these lawsuits, to VAMs as teacher measurement and accountability strategies. “The lessons to be learned from these cases are both important and timely” given that “[u]nder the Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA), local education leaders once again have authority to decide for themselves how to assess teachers’ work.”

The most pertinent and also common issues as per these cases were as follows:

(1) Inconsistencies in teachers’ VAM-based estimates from one year to the next that are sometimes “wildly different.” Across these lawsuits, issues with reliability were very evident, whereas teachers classified as “effective” one year were either theorized or demonstrated to have around a 25%-59% chance of being classified as “ineffective” the next year, or vice versa, with other permutations also possible. As per our profession’s Standards for Educational and Psychological Testing, reliability should, rather, be observed whereby VAM estimates of teacher effectiveness are more or less consistent over time, from one year to the next, regardless of the type of students and perhaps subject areas that teachers teach.

(2) Bias in teachers’ VAM-based estimates were also of note, whereby documents suggested or evidenced that bias, or rather biased estimates of teachers’ actual effects does indeed exist (although this area was also of most contention and dispute). Specific to VAMs, since teachers are not randomly assigned the students they teach, whether their students are invariably more or less motivated, smart, knowledgeable, or capable can bias students’ test-based data, and teachers’ test-based data when aggregated. Court documents, although again not without counterarguments, suggested that VAM-based estimates are sometimes biased, especially when relatively homogeneous sets of students (i.e., English Language Learners (ELLs), gifted and special education students, free-or-reduced lunch eligible students) are non-randomly concentrated into schools, purposefully placed into classrooms, or both. Research suggests that this also sometimes happens regardless of the the sophistication of the statistical controls used to block said bias.

(3) The gaming mechanisms in play within teacher evaluation systems in which VAMs play a key role, or carry significant evaluative weight, were also of legal concern and dispute. That administrators sometimes inflate the observational ratings of their teachers whom they want to protect, while simultaneously offsetting the weight the VAMs sometimes carry was of note, as was the inverse. That administrators also sometimes lower teachers’ ratings to better align them with their “more objective” VAM counterparts were also at issue. “So argued the plaintiffs in the Houston and Tennessee lawsuits, for example. In those systems, school leaders appear to have given precedence to VAM scores, adjusting their classroom observations to match them. In both cases, administrators admitted to doing so, explaining that they sensed pressure to ensure that their ‘subjective’ classroom ratings were in sync with the VAM’s ‘objective’ scores.” Both sets of behavior distort the validity (or “truthfulness”) of any teacher evaluation system and are in violation of the same, aforementioned Standards for Educational and Psychological Testing that call for VAM scores and observation ratings to be kept separate. One indicator should never be adjusted to offset or to fit the other.

(4) Transparency, or the lack thereof, was also a common issue across cases. Transparency, which can be defined as the extent to which something is accessible and readily capable of being understood, pertains to whether VAM-based estimates are accessible and make sense to those at the receiving ends. “Not only should [teachers] have access to [their VAM-based] information for instructional purposes, but if they believe their evaluations to be unfair, they should be able to see all of the relevant data and calculations so that they can defend themselves.” In no case was this more legally pertinent than in Houston Federation of Teachers v. Houston Independent School District in Texas. Here, the presiding judge ruled that teachers did have “legitimate claims to see how their scores were calculated. Concealing this information, the judge ruled, violated teachers’ due process protections under the 14th Amendment (which holds that no state — or in this case organization — shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process). Given this precedent, it seems likely that teachers in other states and districts will demand transparency as well.”

In the main article (here) we also discuss what states are now doing to (hopefully) improve upon their teacher evaluation systems in terms of using multiple measures to help to evaluate teachers more holistically. We emphasize the (in)formative versus the summative and high-stakes functions of such systems, and allowing teachers to take ownership over such systems in their development and implementation. I will leave you all to read the full article (here) for these details.

In sum, though, when rethinking states’ teacher evaluation systems, especially given the new liberties afforded to states via the Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA), educators, education leaders, policymakers, and the like would do well to look to the past for guidance on what not to do — and what to do better. These legal cases can certainly inform such efforts.

Reference: Close, K., & Amrein-Beardsley, A. (2018). Learning from what doesn’t work in teacher evaluation. Phi Delta Kappan, 100(1), 15-19. Retrieved from http://www.kappanonline.org/learning-from-what-doesnt-work-in-teacher-evaluation/

Effects of the Los Angeles Times Prior Publications of Teachers’ Value-Added Scores

In one of my older posts (here), I wrote about the Los Angeles Times and its controversial move to solicit Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD) students’ test scores via an open-records request, calculate LAUSD teachers’ value-added scores themselves, and then publish thousands of LAUSD teachers’ value-added scores along with their “effectiveness” classifications (e.g., least effective, less effective, average, more effective, and most effective) on their Los Angeles Teacher Ratings website. They did this, repeatedly, since 2010, and they have done this all the while despite the major research-based issues surrounding teachers’ value-added estimates (that hopefully followers of this blog know at least somewhat well). This is also of professional frustration for me since the authors of the initial articles and the creators of the searchable website (Jason Felch and Jason Strong) contacted me back in 2011 regarding whether what they were doing was appropriate, valid, and fair. Despite my strong warnings against it, Felch and Song thanked me for my time and moved forward.

Just yesterday, the National Education Policy Center (NEPC) at the University of Colorado – Boulder, published a Newsletter in which authors answer the following question, as taken from the Newsletter’s title: “Whatever Happened with the Los Angeles Times’ Decision to Publish Teachers’ Value-Added Scores?” Here is what they found, by summarizing one article and two studies on the topic, although you can also certainly read the full report here.

  • Publishing the scores meant already high-achieving students were assigned to the classrooms of higher-rated teachers the next year, [found a study in the peer-reviewed Economics of Education Review]. That could be because affluent or well-connected parents were able to pull strings to get their kids assigned to those top teachers, or because those teachers pushed to teach the highest-scoring students. In other words, the academically rich got even richer — an unintended consequence of what could be considered a journalistic experiment in school reform.
  • The decision to publish the scores led to: (1) A temporary increase in teacher turnover; (2) Improvements
    in value-added scores; and (3) No impact on local housing prices.
  • The Los Angeles Times’ analysis erroneously concluded that there was no relationship between value-added scores and levels of teacher education and experience.
  • It failed to account for the fact that teachers are non-randomly assigned to classes in ways that benefit some and disadvantage others.
  • It generated results that changed when Briggs and Domingue tweaked the underlying statistical model [i.e., yielding different value-estimates and classifications for the same teachers].
  • It produced “a significant number of false positives (teachers rated as effective who are really average), and false negatives (teachers rated as ineffective who are really average).”

After the Los Angeles Times’ used a different approach in 2011, Catherine Durso found:

  • Class composition varied so much that comparisons of value-added scores of two teachers were only valid if both teachers are assigned students with similar characteristics.
  • Annual fluctuations in results were so large that they lead to widely varying conclusions from one year to the next for the same teacher.
  • There was strong evidence that results were often due to the teaching environment, not just the teacher.
  • Some teachers’ scores were based on very little data.

In sum, while “[t]he debate over publicizing value-added scores, so fierce in 2010, has since died down to
a dull roar,” more states (e.g., like in New York and Virginia), organizations (e.g., like Matt Barnum’s Chalbeat), and news outlets (e.g., the Los Angeles Times has apparently discontinued this practice, although their website is still live) need to take a stand against or prohibit the publications of individual teachers’ value-added results from hereon out. As I noted to Jason Felch and Jason Strong a long time ago, this IS simply bad practice.

Much of the Same in Louisiana

As I wrote into a recent post: “…it seems that the residual effects of the federal governments’ former [teacher evaluation reform policies and] efforts are still dominating states’ actions with regards to educational accountability.” In other words, many states are still moving forward, more specifically in terms of states’ continued reliance on the use of value-added models (VAMs) for increased teacher accountability purposes, regardless of the passage of the Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA).

Related, three articles were recently published online (here, here, and here) about how in Louisiana, the state’s old and controversial teacher evaluation system as based on VAMs is resuming after a four-year hiatus. It was put on hold when the state was in the process of adopting The Common Core.

This, of course, has serious implications for the approximately 50,000 teachers throughout the state, or the unknown proportion of them who are now VAM-eligible, believed to be around 15,000 (i.e., approximately 30% which is inline with other state trends).

While the state’s system has been partly adjusted, whereas 50% of a teacher’s evaluation was to be based on growth in student achievement over time using VAMs, and the new system has reduced this percentage down to 35%, now teachers of mathematics, English, science, and social studies are also to be held accountable using VAMs. The other 50% of these teachers’ evaluation scores are to be assessed using observations with 15% based on student learning targets (a.k.a., student learning objectives (SLOs)).

Evaluation system output are to be used to keep teachers from earning tenure, or to cause teachers to lose the tenure they might already have.

Among other controversies and issues of contention noted in these articles (see again here, here, and here), one of note (highlighted here) is also that now, “even after seven years”… the state is still “unable to truly explain or provide the actual mathematical calculation or formula’ used to link test scores with teacher ratings. ‘This obviously lends to the distrust of the entire initiative among the education community.”

A spokeswoman for the state, however, countered the transparency charge noting that the VAM formula has been on the state’s department of education website, “and updated annually, since it began in 2012.” She did not provide a comment about how to adequately explain the model, perhaps because she could not either.

Just because it might be available does not mean it is understandable and, accordingly, usable. This we have come to know from administrators, teachers, and yes, state-level administrators in charge of these models (and their adoption and implementation) for years. This is, indeed, one of the largest criticisms of VAMs abound.

One Florida District Kisses VAMs Goodbye

I recently wrote about how, in Louisiana, the state is reverting back to its value-added model (VAM)-based teacher accountability system after its four year hiatus (see here). The post titled “Much of the Same in Louisiana” likely did not come as a surprise to teachers there in that the state (like most other states in the sunbelt, excluding California) have a common and also perpetual infatuation with such systems, whether they be based on student-level or teacher-level accountability.

Well, at least one school district in Florida is kissing the state’s six-year infatuation with its VAM-based teacher accountability system goodbye. I could have invoked a much more colorful metaphor here, but let’s just go with something along the lines of a sophomoric love affair.

According to a recent article in the Tampa Bay Times (see here), “[u]sing new authority from the [state] Legislature, the Citrus County School Board became the first in the state to stop using VAM, citing its unfairness and opaqueness…[with this]…decision…expected to prompt other boards to action.”

That’s all the article has to offer on the topic, but let’s all hope others, in Florida and beyond, do follow.

A “Next Generation” Vision for School, Teacher, and Student Accountability

Within a series of prior posts (see, for example, here and here), I have written about what the Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA), passed in December of 2015, means for the U.S., or more specifically states’ school and teacher evaluation systems as per the federal government’s prior mandates requiring their use of growth and value-added models (VAMs).

Related, states were recently (this past May) required to submit to the federal government their revised school and teacher evaluation plans, post ESSA, given how they have changed, or not. While I have a doctoral student currently gathering updated teacher evaluation data, state-by-state, and our preliminary findings indicate that “things” have not (yet) changed much post ESSA, at least at the teacher level of focus in this study and except for in a few states (e.g., Connecticut, Oklahoma), states still have the liberties to change that which they do on both ends (i.e., school and teacher accountability).

Recently, a colleague recently shared with me a study titled “Next Generation Accountability: A Vision for School Improvement Under ESSA” that warrants coverage here, in hopes that states are still “out there” trying to reform their school and teacher evaluation systems, of course, for the better. While the document was drafted by folks coming from the aforementioned state of Oklahoma, who are also affiliated with the Learning Policy Institute, it is important to note that the document was also vetted by some “heavy hitters” in this line of research including, but not limited to, David C. Berliner (Arizona State University), Peter W. Cookson Jr. (American Institutes for Research (AIR)), Linda Darling-Hammond (Stanford University), and William A. Firestone (Rutgers University).

As per ESSA, states are to have increased opportunities “to develop innovative strategies for advancing equity, measuring success, and developing cycles of continuous improvement” while using “multiple measures to assess school and student performance” (p. iii). Likewise, the authors of this report state that “A broader spectrum of indicators,
going well beyond a summary of annual test performance, seems necessary to account transparently for performance and assign responsibility for improvement.”

Here are some of their more specific recommendations that I found of value for blog followers:

  • The continued use of a single composite indicator to reduce and then sort teachers or schools by their overall effectiveness or performance (e.g., using teacher “effectiveness” categories or school A–F letter grades) is myopic, to say the least. This is because doing this (a) misses all that truly “matters,” including  multidimensional concepts and (non)cognitive competencies we want students to know and to be able to do, not captured by large-scale tests; and (b) inhibits the usefulness of what may be informative, stand-alone data (i.e., as taken from “multiple measures” individually) once these data are reduced and then collapsed so that they can be used for hierarchical categorizations and rankings. This also (c) very much trivializes the multiple causes of low achievement, also of importance and in much greater need of attention.
  • Accordingly, “Next Generation” accountability systems should include “a broad palette of functionally significant indicators to replace [such] single composite indicators [as this] will likely be regarded as informational rather than controlling, thereby motivating stakeholders to action” (p. ix). Stakeholders should be defined in the following terms…
  • “Next Generation” accountability systems should incorporate principles of “shared accountability,” whereby educational responsibility and accountability should be “distributed across system components and not foisted upon any one group of actors or stakeholders” (p. ix). “[E]xerting pressure on stakeholders who do not have direct control over [complex educational] elements is inappropriate and worse, harmful” (p. ix). Accordingly, the goal of “shared accountability” is to “create an accountability environment in which all participants [including governmental organizations] recognize their obligations and commitments in relation to each other” (p. ix) and their collective educational goals.
  • To facilitate this, “Next Generation” information systems should be designed and implemented in order to service the “dual reporting needs of compliance with federal mandates and the particular improvement needs of a state’s schools,” while also addressing “the different information needs of state, district, school site
    leadership, teachers, and parents” (p. ix). Data may include, at minimum, data on school resources, processes, outcomes, and other nuanced indicators, and this information must be made transparent and accessible in order for all types of data users to be responsive, holistically and individually (e.g, at school or classroom levels). The formative functions of such “Next Generation” informational systems, accordingly, take priority, at least for initial terms, until informational data can be used to, with priority, “identify and transform schools in catastrophic failure” (p. ix).
  • Related, all test- or other educational measurement-related components of states’ “Next Generation” statutes and policies should adhere to the Standards for Educational and Psychological Testing, and more specifically their definitions of reliability, validity, bias, fairness, and the like. Statutes and policies should also be written “in the least restrictive and prescriptive terms possible to allow for [continous] corrective action and improvement” (p. x).
  • Finally, “Next Generation” accountability systems should adhere to the following five essentials: “(a) state, district, and school leaders must create a system-wide culture grounded in “learning to improve;” (b) learning to improve using [the aforementioned informational systems also] necessitates the [overall] development of [students’] strong pedagogical data-literacy skills; (c) resources in addition to funding—including time, access to expertise, and collaborative opportunities—should be prioritized for sustaining these ongoing improvement efforts; (d) there must be a coherent structure of state-level support for learning to improve, including the development of a strong Longitudinal Data System (LDS) infrastructure; and (e) educator labor market policy in some states may need adjustment to support the above elements” (p. x).

To read more, please access the full report here.

In sum, “Next Generation” accountability systems aim at “a loftier goal—universal college and career readiness—a goal that current accountability systems were not designed to achieve. To reach this higher level, next generation accountability must embrace a wider vision, distribute trustworthy performance information, and build support infrastructure, while eliciting the assent, support, and enthusiasm of citizens and educators” (p. vii).

As briefly noted prior, “a few states have been working to put more supportive, humane accountability systems in place, but others remain stuck in a compliance mindset that undermines their ability to design effective accountability systems” (p. vii). Perhaps (or perhaps likely) this is because for the past decade or so states invested so much time, effort, and money to “reforming” their prior teacher evaluations systems as formerly required by the federal government. This included investments in states’ growth models of VAMs, onto which many/most states seem to be holding firm.

Hence, while it seems that the residual effects of the federal governments’ former efforts are still dominating states’ actions with regards to educational accountability, hopefully some states can at least begin to lead the way to what will likely yield the educational reform…still desired…

The New York Times on “The Little Known Statistician” Who Passed

As many of you may recall, I wrote a post last March about the passing of William L. Sanders at age 74. Sanders developed the Education Value-Added Assessment System (EVAAS) — the value-added model (VAM) on which I have conducted most of my research (see, for example, here and here) and the VAM at the core of most of the teacher evaluation lawsuits in which I have been (or still am) engaged (see here, here, and here).

Over the weekend, though, The New York Times released a similar piece about Sanders’s passing, titled “The Little-Known Statistician Who Taught Us to Measure Teachers.” Because I had multiple colleagues and blog followers email me (or email me about) this article, I thought I would share it out with all of you, with some additional comments, of course, but also given the comments I already made in my prior post here.

First, I will start by saying that the title of this article is misleading in that what this “little-known” statistician contributed to the field of education was hardly “little” in terms of its size and impact. Rather, Sanders and his associates at SAS Institute Inc. greatly influenced our nation in terms of the last decade of our nation’s educational policies, as largely bent on high-stakes teacher accountability for educational reform. This occurred in large part due to Sanders’s (and others’) lobbying efforts when the federal government ultimately choose to incentivize and de facto require that all states hold their teachers accountable for their value-added, or lack thereof, while attaching high-stakes consequences (e.g., teacher termination) to teachers’ value-added estimates. This, of course, was to ensure educational reform. This occurred at the federal level, as we all likely know, primarily via Race to the Top and the No Child Left Behind Waivers essentially forced upon states when states had to adopt VAMs (or growth models) to also reform their teachers, and subsequently their schools, in order to continue to receive the federal funds upon which all states still rely.

It should be noted, though, that we as a nation have been relying upon similar high-stakes educational policies since the late 1970s (i.e., for now over 35 years); however, we have literally no research evidence that these high-stakes accountability policies have yielded any of their intended effects, as still perpetually conceptualized (see, for example, Nevada’s recent legislative ruling here) and as still advanced via large- and small-scale educational policies (e.g., we are still A Nation At Risk in terms of our global competitiveness). Yet, we continue to rely on the logic in support of such “carrot and stick” educational policies, even with this last decade’s teacher- versus student-level “spin.” We as a nation could really not be more ahistorical in terms of our educational policies in this regard.

Regardless, Sanders contributed to all of this at the federal level (that also trickled down to the state level) while also actively selling his VAM to state governments as well as local school districts (i.e., including the Houston Independent School District in which teacher plaintiffs just won a recent court ruling against the Sanders value-added system here), and Sanders did this using sets of (seriously) false marketing claims (e.g., purchasing and using the EVAAS will help “clear [a] path to achieving the US goal of leading the world in college completion by the year 2020”). To see two empirical articles about the claims made to sell Sanders’s EVAAS system, the research non-existent in support of each of the claims, and the realities of those at the receiving ends of this system (i.e., teachers) as per their experiences with each of the claims, see here and here.

Hence, to assert that what this “little known” statistician contributed to education was trivial or inconsequential is entirely false. Thankfully, with the passage of the Every Student Succeeds Act” (ESSA) the federal government came around, in at least some ways. While not yet acknowledging how holding teachers accountable for their students’ test scores, while ideal, simply does not work (see the “Top Ten” reasons why this does not work here), at least the federal government has given back to the states the authority to devise, hopefully, some more research-informed educational policies in these regards (I know….).

Nonetheless, may he rest in peace (see also here), perhaps also knowing that his forever stance of “[making] no apologies for the fact that his methods were too complex for most of the teachers whose jobs depended on them to understand,” just landed his EVAAS in serious jeopardy in court in Houston (see here) given this stance was just ruled as contributing to the violation of teachers’ Fourteenth Amendment rights (i.e., no state or in this case organization shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process [emphasis added]).

Rest in Peace, EVAAS Developer William L. Sanders

Over the last 3.5 years since I developed this blog, I have written many posts about one particular value-added model (VAM) – the Education Value-Added Assessment System (EVAAS), formerly known as the Tennessee Value-Added Assessment System (TVAAS), now known by some states as the TxVAAS in Texas, the PVAAS in Pennsylvania, and also known as the generically-named EVAAS in states like Ohio, North Carolina, and South Carolina (and many districts throughout the nation). It is this model on which I have conducted most of my research (see, for example, the first piece I published about this model here, in which most of the claims I made still stand, although EVAAS modelers disagreed here). And it is this model that is at the source of the majority of the teacher evaluation lawsuits in which I have been or still am currently engaged (see, for example, details about the Houston lawsuit here, the former Tennessee lawsuit here, and the new Texas lawsuit here, although the model is more peripheral in this particular case).

Anyhow, the original EVAAS model (i.e, the TVAAS) was originally developed by a man named William L. Sanders who ultimately sold it to SAS Institute Inc. that now holds all rights to the proprietary model. See, for example, here. See also examples of prior posts about Sanders here, here, here, here, here, and here. See also examples of prior posts about the EVAAS here, here, here, here, here, and here.

It is William L. Sanders who just passed away and we sincerely hope may rest in peace.

Sanders had a bachelors degree in animal science and a doctorate in statistics and quantitative genetics. As an adjunct professor and agricultural statistician in the college of business at the University of Knoxville, Tennessee, he developed in the late 1980s his TVAAS.

Sanders thought that educators struggling with student achievement in the state should “simply” use more advanced statistics, similar to those used when modeling genetic and reproductive trends among cattle, to measure growth, hold teachers accountable for that growth, and solve the educational measurement woes facing the state of Tennessee at the time. It was to be as simple as that…. I should also mention that given this history, not surprisingly, Tennessee was one of the first states to receive Race to the Top funds to the tune of $502 million to further advance this model; hence, this has also contributed to this model’s popularity across the nation.

Nonetheless, Sanders passed away this past Thursday, March 16, 2017, from natural causes in Columbia, Tennessee. As per his obituary here,

  • He was most well-known for developing “a method used to measure a district, school, and teacher’s effect on student performance by tracking the year-to-year progress of students against themselves over their school career with various teachers’ classes.”
  • He “stood for a hopeful view that teacher effectiveness dwarfs all other factors as a predictor of student academic growth…[challenging]…decades of assumptions that student family life, income, or ethnicity has more effect on student learning.”
  • He believed, in the simplest of terms, “that educational influence matters and teachers matter most.”

Of course, we have much research evidence to counter these claims, but for now we will just leave all of this at that. Again, may he rest in peace.

David Berliner on The Purported Failure of America’s Schools

My primary mentor, David Berliner (Regents Professor at Arizona State University (ASU)) wrote, yesterday, a blog post for the Equity Alliance Blog (also at ASU) on “The Purported Failure of America’s Schools, and Ways to Make Them Better” (click here to access the original blog post). See other posts about David’s scholarship on this blog here, here, and here. See also one of our best blog posts that David also wrote here, about “Why Standardized Tests Should Not Be Used to Evaluate Teachers (and Teacher Education Programs).”

In sum, for many years David has been writing “about the lies told about the poor performance of our students and the failure of our schools and teachers.” For example, he wrote one of the education profession’s all time classics and best sellers: The Manufactured Crisis: Myths, Fraud, And The Attack On America’s Public Schools (1995). If you have not read it, you should! All educators should read this book, on that note and in my opinion, but also in the opinion of many other iconic educational scholars throughout the U.S. (Paufler, Amrein-Beardsley, Hobson, under revision for publication).

While the title of this book accurately captures its contents, more specifically it “debunks the myths that test scores in America’s schools are falling, that illiteracy is rising, and that better funding has no benefit. It shares the good news about public education.” I’ve found the contents of this book to still be my best defense when others with whom I interact attack America’s public schools, as often misinformed and perpetuated by many American politicians and journalists.

In this blog post David, once again, debunks many of these myths surrounding America’s public schools using more up-to-date data from international tests, our country’s National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP), state-level SAT and ACT scores, and the like. He reminds us of how student characteristics “strongly influence the [test] scores obtained by the students” at any school and, accordingly, “strongly influence” or bias these scores when used in any aggregate form (e.g., to hold teachers, schools, districts, and states accountable for their students’ performance).

He reminds us that “in the US, wealthy children attending public schools that serve the wealthy are competitive with any nation in the world…[but in]…schools in which low-income students do not achieve well, [that are not competitive with many nations in the world] we find the common correlates of poverty: low birth weight in the neighborhood, higher than average rates of teen and single parenthood, residential mobility, absenteeism, crime, and students in need of special education or English language instruction.” These societal factors explain poor performance much more (i.e., more variance explained) than any school-level, and as pertinent to this blog, teacher-level factor (e.g., teacher quality as measured by large-scale standardized test scores).

In this post David reminds us of much, much more, that we need to remember and also often recall in defense of our public schools and in support of our schools’ futures (e.g., research-based notes to help “fix” some of our public schools).

Again, please do visit the original blog post here to read more.

NCTQ on States’ Teacher Evaluation Systems’ Failures

The controversial National Council on Teacher Quality (NCTQ) — created by the conservative Thomas B. Fordham Institute and funded (in part) by the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation as “part of a coalition for ‘a better orchestrated agenda’ for accountability, choice, and using test scores to drive the evaluation of teachers” (see here; see also other instances of controversy here and here) — recently issued yet another report about state’s teacher evaluation systems titled: “Running in Place: How New Teacher Evaluations Fail to Live Up to Promises.” See a related blog post in Education Week about this report here. See also a related blog post about NCTQ’s prior large-scale (and also slanted) study — “State of the States 2015: Evaluating Teaching, Leading and Learning” — here. Like I did in that post, I summarize this study below.

From the abstract: Authors of this report find that “within the 30 states that [still] require student learning measures to be at least a significant factor in teacher evaluations, state guidance and rules in most states allow teachers to be rated effective even if they receive low scores on the student learning component of the evaluation.” They add in the full report that in many states “a high score on an evaluation’s observation and [other] non-student growth components [can] result in a teacher earning near or at the minimum number of points needed to earn an effective rating. As a result, a low score on the student growth component of the evaluation is sufficient in several states to push a teacher over the minimum number of points needed to earn a summative effective rating. This essentially diminishes any real influence the student growth component has on the summative evaluation rating” (p. 3-4).

The first assumption surrounding the authors’ main tenets they make explicit: that “[u]nfortunately, [the] policy transformation [that began with the publication of the “Widget Effect” report in 2009] has not resulted in drastic alterations in outcomes” (p. 2). This is because, “[in] effect…states have been running in place” (p. 2) and not using teachers’ primarily test-based indicators for high-stakes decision-making. Hence, “evaluation results continue to look much like they did…back in 2009” (p. 2). The authors then, albeit ahistorically, ask, “How could so much effort to change state laws result in so little actual change?” (p. 2). Yet they don’t realize (or care to realize) that this is because we have almost 40 years of evidence that really any type of test-based, educational accountability policies and initiatives have never yield their intended consequences (i.e., increased student achievement on national and international indicators). Rather, the authors argue, that “most states’ evaluation laws fated these systems to status quo results long before” they really had a chance (p. 2).

The authors’ second assumption they imply: that the two most often used teacher evaluation indicators (i.e., the growth or value-added and observational measures) should be highly correlated, which many argue they should be IF in fact they are measuring general teacher effectiveness. But the more fundamental assumption here is that if the student learning (i.e., test based) indicators do not correlate with the observational indicators, the latter MUST be wrong, biased, distorted, and accordingly less trustworthy and the like. They add that “teachers and students are not well served when a teacher is rated effective or higher even though her [sic] students have not made sufficient gains in their learning over the course of a school year” (p. 4). Accordingly, they add that “evaluations should require that a teacher is rated well on both the student growth measures and the professional practice component (e.g., observations, student surveys, etc.) in order to be rated effective” (p. 4). Hence, also in this report the authors put forth recommendations for how states might address this challenge. See these recommendations forthcoming, as also related to a new phenomenon my students and I are studying called artificial inflation.

Artificial inflation is a term I recently coined to represent what is/was happening in Houston, and elsewhere (e.g., Tennessee), when district leaders (e.g., superintendents) mandate or force principals and other teacher effectiveness appraisers or evaluators to align their observational ratings of teachers’ effectiveness with teachers’ value-added scores, with the latter being (sometimes relentlessly) considered the “objective measure” around which all other measures (e.g., subjective observational measures) should revolve, or align. Hence, the push is to conflate the latter “subjective” measure to match the former “objective” measure, even if the process of artificial conflation causes both indicators to become invalid. As per my affidavit from the still ongoing lawsuit in Houston (see here), “[t]o purposefully and systematically endorse the engineering and distortion of the perceptible ‘subjective’ indicator, using the perceptibly ‘objective’ indicator as a keystone of truth and consequence, is more than arbitrary, capricious, and remiss…not to mention in violation of the educational measurement field’s “Standards for Educational and Psychological Testing.”

Nonetheless…

Here is one important figure, taken out of context in some ways on purpose (e.g., as the text surrounding this particular figure is ironically, subjectively used to define what the NCTQ defines as as indicators or progress, or regress).

Near Figure 1 (p. 1) the authors note that “as of January 2017, there has been little evidence of a large-scale reversal of states’ formal evaluation policies. In fact, only four states (Alaska, Mississippi, North Carolina, and Oklahoma) have reversed course on factoring student learning into a teacher’s evaluation rating” (p. 3). While this reversal of four is not illustrated in their accompanying figure, see also a prior post about what other states, beyond just these four states of dishonorable mention, have done to “reverse” the “course” (p. 3) here. While the authors shame all states for minimizing teachers’ test-based ratings before these systems had a chance, as also ignorant to what they cite as “a robust body of research” (without references or citations here, and few elsewhere in a set of footnotes), they add that it remains an unknown as to “why state educational agencies put forth regulations or guidance that would allow teachers to be rated effective without meeting their student growth goals” (p. 4). Many of us know that this was often done to counter the unreliable and invalid results often yielded via the “objective” test-based sides of things that the NCTQ continues to advance.

Otherwise, here are also some important descriptive findings:

  • Thirty states require measures of student academic growth to be at least a significant factor within teacher evaluations; another 10 states require some student growth, and 11 states do not require any objective measures of student growth (p. 5).
  • With only [emphasis added] two exceptions, in the 30 states where student
    growth is at least a significant factor in teacher evaluations, state
    rules or guidance effectively allow teachers who have not met student
    growth goals to still receive a summative rating of at least effective (p. 5).
  • In 18 [of these 30] states, state educational agency regulations and/or guidance
    explicitly permit teachers to earn a summative rating of effective even after earning a less-than-effective score on the student learning portion of their evaluations…these regulations meet the letter of the law while still allowing teachers with low ratings on
    student growth measures to be rated effective or higher (p. 5). In Colorado, for example…a teacher can earn a rating of highly effective with a score of just 1 for student growth (which the state classifies as “less than expected”) in conjunction with a top professional practice score (p. 4).
  • Ten states do not specifically address whether a teacher who has not met student growth goals may be rated as effective or higher. These states neither specifically allow nor specifically disallow such a scenario, but by failing to provide guidance to prevent such an occurrence, they enable it to exist (p. 6).
  • Only two of the 30 states (Indiana and Kentucky) make it impossible for a teacher who has not been found effective at increasing student learning to receive a summative rating of effective (p. 6).

Finally, here are some of their important recommendations, as related to all of the above, and to create more meaningful teacher evaluation systems. So they argue, states should:

  • Establish policies that preclude teachers from earning a label of effective if they are found ineffective at increasing student learning (p. 12).
  • Track the results of discrete components within evaluation systems, both statewide and districtwide. In districts where student growth measures and observation measures are significantly out of alignment, states should reevaluate their systems and/or offer districts technical assistance (p. 12). ][That is, states should possibly promote artificial inflation as we have observed elsewhere. The authors add that] to ensure that evaluation ratings better reflect teacher performance, states should [more specifically] track the results of each evaluation measure to pinpoint where misalignment between components, such as between student learning and observation measures, exists. Where major components within an evaluation system are significantly misaligned, states should examine their systems and offer districts technical assistance where needed, whether through observation training or examining student growth models or calculations (p. 12-13). [Tennessee, for example,] publishes this information so that it is transparent and publicly available to guide actions by key stakeholders and point the way to needed reforms (p. 13).

See also state-by-state reports in the appendices of the full report, in case your state was one of the state’s that responded or, rather, “recognized the factual accuracy of this analysis.”

Citation: Walsh, K., Joseph, N., Lakis, K., & Lubell, S. (2017). Running in place: How new teacher evaluations fail to live up to promises. Washington DC: National Council on Teacher Quality (NCTQ). Retrieved from http://www.nctq.org/dmsView/Final_Evaluation_Paper

States’ Teacher Evaluation Systems Now “All over the Map”

We are now just one year past the federal passage of the Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA), within which it is written that states must no longer set up teacher-evaluation systems based in significant part on their students’ test scores. As per a recent article written in Education Week, accordingly, most states are still tinkering with their teacher evaluation systems—particularly regarding the student growth or value-added measures (VAMs) that were also formerly required to help states assesses teachers’ purported impacts on students’ test scores over time.

“States now have a newfound flexibility to adjust their evaluation systems—and in doing so, they’re all over the map.” Likewise, though, “[a] number of states…have been moving away from [said] student growth [and value-added] measures in [teacher] evaluations,” said a friend, colleague, co-editor, and occasional writer on this blog (see, for example, here and here) Kimberly Kappler Hewitt (University of North Carolina at Greensboro).  She added that this is occurring “whether [this] means postponing [such measures’] inclusion, reducing their percentage in the evaluation breakdown, or eliminating those measures altogether.”

While states like Alabama, Iowa, and Ohio seem to still be moving forward with the attachment of students’ test scores to their teachers, other states seem to be going “back and forth” or putting a halt to all of this altogether (e.g, California). Alaska cut back the weight of the measure, while New Jersey tripled the weight to count for 30% of a teacher’s evaluation score, and then introduced a bill to reduce it back to 0%. In New York teacher are to still receive a test-based evaluation score, but it is not to be tied to consequences and completely revamped by 2019. In Alabama a bill that would have tied 25% of a teacher’s evaluation to his/her students’ ACT and ACT Aspire college-readiness tests has yet to see the light of day. In North Carolina state leaders re-framed the use(s) of such measures to be more for improvement tool (e.g., for professional development), but not “a hammer” to be used against schools or teachers. The same thing is happening in Oklahoma, although this state is not specifically mentioned in this piece.

While some might see all of this as good news — or rather better news than what we have seen for nearly the last decade during which states, state departments of education, and practitioners have been grappling with and trying to make sense of student growth measures and VAMs — others are still (and likely forever will be) holding onto what now seems to be some of the now unclenched promises attached to such stronger accountability measures.

Namely in this article, Daniel Weisberg of The New Teacher Project (TNTP) and author of the now famous “Widget Effect” report — about “Our National Failure to Acknowledge and Act on Differences in Teacher Effectiveness” that helped to “inspire” the last near-decade of these policy-based reforms — “doesn’t see states backing away” from using these measures given ESSA’s new flexibility. We “haven’t seen the clock turn back to 2009, and I don’t think [we]’re going to see that.”

Citation: Will, M. (2017). States are all over the map when it comes to how they’re looking to approach teacher-evaluation systems under ESSA. Education Week. Retrieved from http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2017/01/04/assessing-quality-of-teaching-staff-still-complex.html?intc=EW-QC17-TOC&_ga=1.138540723.1051944855.1481128421